MISTRAL by André Nijsen & Nico Vellinga










































A Model to Measure the Administrative 
burden of Businesses 
André F.M. Nijsen 
Dr. Nico Vellinga 
Zoetermeer, March 2002 
 
SCALES 







ISBN:     90-371-0846-6 
Order number:   H200110 
Price:     € 21.- 
 
The industry and size-class module of Mistral
 has been developed in the framework of the Research 
Programme SCALES (Scientific AnaLysis of Entrepreneurship and SMEs), which is financed by the Dutch 
Ministry of Economic Affairs. We are grateful for the fine work done by John Boog, Ton Kwaak, Mirjam 
Tom, Sjaak Vendrig and Edwin van der Leeuw. We are especially grateful for the stimulating guidance 
of Gerrit de Wit, being the coordinator of the SCALES Programme. 
Most recent EIM reports and much more SMEs and Entrepreneurship can be found at: www.eim.nl/mkb-
en-ondernemerschap 
 
The responsibility for the contents of this report lies with EIM. Quoting numbers or text in papers, essays 
and books is permitted only when the source is clearly mentioned. No part of this publication may be 
copied and/or published in any form or by any means, or stored in a retrieval system, without the prior 
written permission of EIM. 
EIM does not accept responsibility for printing errors and/or other imperfections.   3 
Contents 
1  Introduction 5 
1.1  General  5 
1.2  Regulations applying to businesses  5 
1.3  A short history of Mistral
® 6  
1.4  Outline of the report  7 
2  Mistral
®: why do we need it?  9 
2.1  Introduction 9 
2.2  Why is information about administrative burdens relevant?  9 
2.3  Why do we need a model for calculating administrative burdens?  10 
3  When to apply Mistral
®? 15 
3.1  Introduction 15 
3.2  Quick scans  15 
3.3  Baseline measurements  16 
3.4  Mistral
® as an advisory instrument  17 
3.5  Monitoring instrument  17 
4  Mistral
®: how does it work?  19 
4.1  Introduction 19 
4.2  Definitions and concepts  19 
4.3  Input of the model  22 
4.4  Processing the model  22 
4.5  Output of the model  24 
5  Description of Mistral
® in detail  27 
5.1  Introduction 27 
5.2  Decomposition into a number of messages  27 
5.3  Decomposition of the costs of a message  28 
5.4  Presenting the level of administrative burden  29 
6  Breakdown into industries and size classes  31 
6.1  Introduction 31 
6.2  Baseline measurement selected policy areas: bottom-up approach  32 
6.3  First approximation: entities affected  33 
6.4  Correction for scope of policy area  34 
6.5  Corrections for differences in rates and tariffs  36 
6.6  Evaluation 38 
7  Some results obtained using Mistral
 39 
7.1  Introduction 39 
7.2  Macro results policy area employees’ social insurances  39 
7.3  Meso results: industries and size classes  44 
References 47 4   
Annexes 
I  List of symbols used  49 
II  Breakdown of entities into size classes and industries  51 
III  Outsourcing and tariffs  53 
IV  Value added  55 





   5 
1 Introduction 
1.1 General 
Administrative burdens can be measured using Mistral
®, the Dutch acronym for Measur-
ing Instrument Administrative Burdens (Burdens are ‘Lasten’ in Dutch). This report con-
tains a description of Mistral
®.  
 
We will start with a brief introduction of the types of legal obligations enterprises will 
encounter in the constitutional state or, in other words, a modern democracy. Adminis-
trative burdens are the costs of a special type of these legal obligations of enterprises, 
viz. obligations to transfer information to government (section 1.2). This chapter will be 
closed with a brief history of Mistral
® (section 1.3) and the presentation of the outline 
of this report in section 1.4. 
1.2  Regulations applying to businesses 
Government of a social constitutional state imposes obligations on businesses to regu-
late their behaviour and acquire information about their activities for control purposes. 
There are two types of obligations. The first type relates to the ‘content’ of these activi-
ties and endeavours to achieve compliance by businesses with the standards stipulated 
by society. The second type relates to the compulsory transfer of information by busi-
nesses (Nijsen, 2000: 18). The costs incurred by businesses in complying with the obli-
gation to transfer information are called administrative burdens.  
 
Content obligations 
What does it mean for a business to operate within a social constitutional state? Busi-
nesses have to behave in a certain way or abstain from certain types of behaviour in 
order to allow the government to safeguard public interests
1
. Such rules of behaviour 
applying to businesses are called content regulations, many of which are laid down in 





With a view to being able to implement these regulations and the administrative moni-
toring and enforcement of compliance with these content regulations, the government 
also imposes transfer of information regulations on relevant conditions in, and behav-
iour/transactions by businesses. The majority of the transfers of information obligations 
are also included in the Special Volumes of Administrative Law. 
 
Demarcation line 
The demarcation line between content and information transfer obligations is not al-
ways clear. In cases where the content obligations primarily aim to realise physical ob-
jectives in businesses, such as safe working conditions in conformance with the specifi-
 
1
 This also applies, of course, to the citizens in a social constitutional state. 
2
 The general part is comprised mainly of abstracts and generalizations of the Special Volumes, in the 
fields of procedures such as objections and appeals. 6   
cations of the Working Conditions Act, there is little room for doubt. Making sure, for 
example, that it is possible to look outside from the work location, is complying with a 
content obligation. Reporting this fact in the Annual Working Conditions planning is a 
transfer of information obligation. Another example is employing persons from certain 
target groups, for example ethnic minorities. Hiring people from this category is com-
plying with a content obligation. Recording this fact - in compliance with the law on 
‘Stimulating the Position of Ethnic Minorities on the Labour Market’ in a report that has 
to be submitted annually and providing all the accompanying particulars and registra-
tions - is complying with transfer of information obligations. 
 
The regulations covering the transfer of information to third parties, for example citi-
zens, differ from those applying to businesses that are directly involved and the gov-
ernment. These transfer of information obligations do not aim primarily at supplying 
information to the government for monitoring and enforcing compliance, but aim much 
more at achieving a public goal in a more direct way, for example, well informed citi-
zens or consumers so that these will steer their behaviour in the desired direction. 
Regulations involving the transfer of information to third parties should, in our opinion, 
be considered to be content obligations. This becomes relevant as soon as safeguarding 
a public interest requires that third parties, usually citizens or consumers, are informed 
or will be informed about the behaviour of certain parties or about the characteristics of 
products. Public interests involve, for example, protecting the privacy of citizens, meas-
ures to safeguard the health of consumers or environmental protection. 
 
The law protecting personal privacy obliges the holder of such registers to inform the 
citizens whose particulars are contained in these registers and request their permission 
immediately, if the information in the register is to be used for other purposes than 
those for which it was collected. The content obligations on which this is based and 
apply to the register holder are the rules governing the fact that personal particulars 
may not be used for purposes other than those for which they were intended. It is 
compulsory for tobacco manufacturers to warn (potential) buyers of their products that 
smoking is a health hazard. A similar obligation applies for manufacturers of alcohol 
drinks. Another example is the obligation to attach information labels to goods. In all 
these cases the transfer of information to third parties refers to a content obligation. As 
soon as parties keeping such registers - tobacco manufactures, breweries and power 
suppliers - have to inform the government about the transfer of information to third 
parties then the transfer of information obligations act as an instrument for administra-
tive monitoring and enforcement (Nijsen, 2001; to be published).  
1.3  A short history of Mistral
® 
In 1994 the Secretary of State of the Dutch Ministry of Finance installed a commission 
the ‘Commissie Vermindering Administratieve Lasten’ (the Commission to Reduce Ad-
ministrative Burdens, named after its chairman the Commission van Lunteren). One of 
the measures taken by the Commission van Lunteren was to instruct EIM to develop a 
special fiscal module as part of Mistral
® (van Lunteren, 1998: 194). This module focuses 
on administrative burdens for businesses, the consequence of fiscal law. The Commis-
sion instructed EIM to start with Payroll tax. However, in 2001, there are about six or 
seven separate fiscal domains in Mistral
®, for instance the domains VAT, Income Tax, 
and Corporate Tax. 
   7 
The Commission on ‘Administratieve Lasten’
1
 (Commission on Administrative Burdens 
named after its chairman, Slechte, the Slechte Commission), which was responsible for 
advising the Dutch government on ways of reducing the administrative burdens in all 
policy areas, recommended that all Dutch departments should use the results of Mis-
tral
® measurements when compiling policy to reduce administrative burdens imposed 
on businesses. The Commission advised each and every department to start preparing 
this type of policy with a bottom-up baseline measurement of all relevant legislation, in 
combination with a system of monitoring on an annual base in order to set measurable 
targets (Commissie Administratieve Lasten, 1999). This positive advice given by the 
Slechte Commission was - among others - based on reports of the Netherlands Bureau 
for Economic Policy Analysis (Centraal Planbureau) and IOO, the Dutch Institute for Re-
search of Government Expenditures (Centraal Planbureau, 1999; Van Ingen, 1999). The 
Dutch government accepted the Commission’s advice. 
 
To date EIM has used Mistral
® to carry out baseline measurements on behalf of the 
Dutch Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Social Af-
fairs and Employment, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Health, Welfare and 
Sport. Since 1999 EIM has also been responsible for the national monitor of administra-
tive burdens for all policy areas. 
1.4  Outline of the report 
The outline of this report is as follows. We continue with answering the question why a 
model like Mistral
® is needed in chapter 2. When to apply Mistral
® will be dealt with in 
chapter 3. In chapter 4 we will discuss how Mistral
® works. We will present a detailed 
technical description of Mistral
® in chapter 5. Chapter 6 contains a description of the 
additional steps, necessary to break down the results of the main model to industry and 
size class of enterprises. Finally, we will present some results of Mistral
® in chapter 7. 
 
1
 Installed at November 27, 1998, by the Dutch Ministers of Economic Affairs and Domestic Affairs; 
Nr. 98069082 WJA/W.   9 
2 Mistral
®: why do we need it? 
2.1 Introduction 
Mistral
® is a model to calculate administrative burdens for businesses adequately and 
efficiently. Why are we interested in facts about administrative burdens? We shall an-
swer this question in section 2.2. Why a model is needed to determine such simple 
things like administrative burdens is the question discussed in section 2.3.  
2.2  Why is information about administrative burdens relevant? 
2.2.1  Brake on economic growth 
To an increasing extent it is being recognised that unnecessary compliance costs for 
businesses - administrative burdens are one part of the compliance costs - may have 
adverse effects on economic growth and employment. Information obligations place a 
relatively heavy administrative burden on medium-sized and small businesses (Boog et 
al., 1994; Allers, 1994; Verwaal, 2000; OECD, 2001). For this reason policy is being 
developed, both nationally and internationally, aiming to eliminate or prevent unneces-
sary compliance costs - in particular for small and medium-sized businesses 
(OECD/PUMA,1997; EIM/ENSR,1995). Sandford argues that tax compliance costs have 
undesirable distributional effects. They are capricious in their incidence, regressive and 
fall with disproportionate severity on small firms in particular (Sandford, 1995). Other 
studies indicated also that administrative burdens are higher for small firms, in terms of 
costs per employee or as a percentage of turnover (Allers, 1994; Boog, 1994).  
Estimates of the cost of complying with information transfer for businesses as a per-
centage of the GDP vary from 2.2 in the Netherlands to 3 or 4% of GDP in other coun-
tries of the European Union (Boog, 1999; EIM/ENSR, 1995; OECD, 2001). 
2.2.2  Hidden and intermingled costs, ‘off-budget’ effects 
The administrative burdens incurred by businesses are in fact hidden costs. No explicit 
account of these can be found in any administration kept by businesses. Administrative 
burdens and other administrative costs are highly intermingled (General Accounting 
Office, 1996: 5, 48-52; Van der Burg en Nijsen, 1998: 263-276). This is what we call 
the allocation problem of administrative burdens.  
 
Even more serious is the fact that the compliance costs for businesses are not included 
when compiling the National Budget. So administrative burdens are ‘off-budget’ effects 
of regulations. Officials who are responsible for designing new legislation and regula-
tions are generally badly informed about the ‘off-budget’ effects of regulations. Esti-
mates of the costs and benefits of legislation and regulations are usually limited to the 
consequences for the National Budget (‘on-budget’ effects). In this respect Van der Bij 
refers to internal and external regulation costs (Van der Bij, 1994: 227 ff.). Regulation 
costs, which are included in the National Budget, are termed internal regulation costs; 
the remaining regulation costs, which remain outside the budget, are termed external 
regulation costs. Consequently, when estimating the budget, calculations are usually 
based on a considerably low budgetary price, and therefore there is little incentive to 
reduce the costs of regulation. Nowadays, this problem is internationally recognised. 
‘The perceived intrusiveness of government regulation in many OECD countries could 
be detected only through anecdotal information, partial indicators and general impres-10   
sions. Systematic efforts to track and account for regulatory effects are uncommon de-
spite a recognition that the scope of regulation is broad indeed’ (Hopkins, 1997: 264). 
2.3  Why do we need a model for calculating administrative burdens? 
2.3.1  Conceptual framework 
In order to solve the problem of the phenomenon of the hidden costs and the alloca-
tion problem we need a conceptual framework that enables the positioning of adminis-
trative burdens within individual enterprise costs.  
 
In theory, the administrative activities that enterprises have to carry out can be distin-
guished as being of several types (Van der Hauw, 1996). Chart 1 gives a theoretic 
framework of these different types of activities. Most of all the administrative proce-
dures that enterprises carry out (block 1 in chart 1), are done for their own sake, be-
cause they provide specific and valuable information about the enterprise (block 2). 
About 60% of total administrative costs of enterprises originate from routine business 
administration as mentioned in block 2 (Boog, van der Burg and Regter, 1994). Exam-
ples of routine business administration are warehousing, procurement and sales admini-
stration and records of debtors. The rest of the administrative activities - about 40% of 
the total administrative costs of enterprises (Boog et al., 1994) - are carried out by en-
terprises in order to meet information obligations that result from national and interna-
tional legislation (block 3). These administrative activities are compulsory for enterprises 
and we define the costs of administrative activities that enterprises have to undertake in 
order to cope with these legislative information obligations as administrative burdens. 
So roughly speaking, administrative burdens amount to about 40% of the total admin-
istrative costs of businesses. 
 
Compulsory administrative activities do not only create burdens for enterprises. Some of 
them give specific and valuable information at firm level and enterprises would carry 
them out even if no legislation existed (block 4). An example of this is the obligation 
referring to the annual account. About 40% of the total administrative burdens (block 
3 = 100%) originate from administrative activities firms would also perform if no legis-
lation existed. The rest of the administrative activities - 60% of administrative burdens - 
would be omitted by enterprises if no legislation existed (Boog et al., 1994).   11 


























Source: EIM/ENSR, 1995. 
2.3.2  Bottlenecks encountered when assessing administrative burdens 
Assessing administrative burdens is complex, because of the allocation problem. In or-
der to be able to assess the administrative burdens of information obligations in prac-
tice and solve these problems, we will have to (Sandford, Godwin, Hardwick en Butter-
worth, 1981; Van der Burg en Nijsen, 1998): 
1  distinguish between administrative activities that are part of the business admini-
stration and administrative activities that are the result of government-imposed leg-
islation; 
2  distinguish between actual administrative burdens (in terms of time or money) and 
perceived administrative burdens (annoyance costs); 
3  clarify the different types of administrative activities for the experts of the enter-
prises that are to be interviewed. 
2.3.3  How can Mistral
® help? 
Basically, there are two approaches to the assessment of administrative burdens: the 
‘top-down approach’ and the ‘bottom-up approach. The main characteristics of both 








from legislation (3) 
Administrative procedures 
enterprises would also 
perform if no legislation 
existed (4) 
Administrative procedures 
enterprises would not 
perform if no legislation 
existed (5) 12   
Table 2.1  Overview of approaches and their main characteristics in order to assess 
administrative burdens 
Aspects  Top-down approach  Bottom-up approach 
Basic principle  Unit: enterprise  Unit: law/regulation 
Coverage of policy areas  All policy areas  One policy area 
Level of aggregation  High  Low 
Research instrument  Mail questionnaire  Expert-interviews in combina-
tion with group discussions 




In the ‘top-down approach’ the individual enterprise is the starting point, the statistical 
unit. The following research phases are part of this approach: 
1  the examination of the total administrative costs of an individual enterprise; 
2  the allocation of these costs over the routine business administration and those 
compulsory administrative activities resulting from information obligations; 
3  the allocation of the burdens resulting from compulsory administrative activities of 
information obligations over the relevant policy areas that the individual enterprise 
has to comply with. 
 
This type of information is mostly gathered by means of a mail questionnaire. A repre-
sentative sample of firms is surveyed in order to obtain information about the adminis-
trative burdens and other relevant data with respect to the individual enterprise (firm 
size, turnover, profits, etc.).  
 
An important advantage of this approach is that the administrative burdens and other 
data are available at the level of the individual enterprise. The large number of enter-
prises and the variables involved allow for detailed cross-analysis. Experience indicates, 
however, that this does not necessarily mean that the resulting figures about adminis-
trative burdens are also accurate. The entrepreneurs surveyed, who as a result may ei-
ther underestimate or overestimate the administrative burdens involved, interpret defi-
nitions of administrative activities differently. Therefore, the outcome of such studies 
has often given rise to criticism (OECD, 2001).  
 
It appears that the variations between the answers, in terms of money, are often quite 
substantial (Allers 1994,Verwaal, 2000). The main reason for such large variations is 
that most entrepreneurs or their bookkeepers have different views about the way their 
firms are complying with the specific information obligations. In reality there will be 
marked differences in efficiency among the various firms. Moreover there is a serious 
risk that respondents will forget to consider the administrative burdens of trivial admin-
istrative activities like becoming familiar with the obligation, receiving the information, 
filing, etc. Finally, there is the risk of intermingling the administrative activities of one 
policy area with the administrative activities of another policy area or, even more seri-
ous, with those of the regular business administrative procedures. It is evident that the 
 
1
 The content of this and the following subsections about the ‘bottom-up approach’ and strengths 
and weaknesses is derived from Van der Burg en Nijsen, 1998: 267-271.    13 
results of an assessment like this are difficult to use, especially in case of monitoring 
administrative burdens.  
 
Allers, talking about mail questionnaires and a ‘top-down approach’ said the following 
about this topic in his dissertation: ‘In practice, however, compliance costs according to 
this definition
1
 are not easily determined. Hence, estimates based on this definition as a 
rough guideline are the best we can produce. The entire discussion is largely academic, 
however, because the measurement of compliance costs, like the measurement of ad-
ministrative costs (costs of enforcing institutes: addition AN), is such a complicated af-
fair. As a result, error margins are considerable. Striving for a high level of sophistica-
tion when defining the exact borders of compliance costs is, therefore, a rather futile 
effort’ (Allers, 1994: 32). 
 
The ‘bottom-up approach’ 
In the ‘bottom-up approach’ the basic principle is that a specific law or regulation is 
subjected to a detailed examination during which all information transfers and the ac-
companying administrative activities are unravelled. Therefore, the specific law or regu-
lation is the measuring unit and not the individual enterprise, as is the case when using 
the ‘top down approach’. The time involved with each activity and the function level at 
which it is carried out (the necessary qualification) are determined during an intensive 
multi-stage process of consultations and discussions - both individual and in groups - 
with experts from firms, accountants and also employers’ and enforcing organisations. 
Information about the function level is needed because function levels can be related to 
enumeration and therefore the hourly wage-rate can be calculated. Instead of focusing 
on the considerable variations between individual firms the average or standard situa-
tion (based on an efficient way of carrying out the necessary administrative activities) 
and relevant exemptions (caused by differences in the specific legal obligations) to this 
standard situation (qua time needed/costs or qua number of firms) are determined. 
 
Strengths and weaknesses of the ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up ap-
proach’ 
Table 2.2 contains an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches. 
 
1
 Compliance costs are all those extra costs, which the entrepreneur must budget for simply in order 
to comply with tax requirements (Allers, 1994: 32). Allers is using the marginalist concept - only the 
extra cost - of administrative burdens; we prefer the integralist concept, viz all costs (Nijsen, 2000: 
90-99). Allers’ study focuses on taxation and public transfers. That’s why he confines administrative 
burdens to tax requirements.  14   
Table 2.2  Strengths and weaknesses of the various methods 
Relevant aspects  Top-down*  Bottom-up** 
Representativeness of sample of enterprises   +  - 
Total scope of policy areas  +  - 
Quick overview of administrative burdens by policy area  +  - 
Ex-post assessment  +  + 
Keys to solutions  -  + 
Ex-ante assessment  -  + 
Assessment of alternatives  -  + 
Accuracy of results  -  + 
Acceptation of results  -  + 
Cost of research in one EU country  +  - 
Cost of research in several EU-countries in case of harmonised 
legislation  - + 
*  Based on a questionnaire. The enterprise is the measuring unit. 
**  Based on expert interviews (or stopwatch-method) combined with group discussions. The spe-
cific law or regulation is the measuring unit. 
+  = an advantage or strength. 
-  = a disadvantage or weakness. 
Source: Van der Burg en Nijsen, 1998: 271. 
 
Mistral
® is an exponent of the bottom-up approach. Hence, it is possible with the help 
of Mistral
® : 
1  to assess the extent of the administrative burdens for enterprises in one policy-area 
or for one legislation at a very detailed level and in an acceptably accurate way; 
2  to carry out ex-ante evaluations of the administrative burdens for enterprises of a 
draft legislation and certain alternatives; 
3  to find keys that can help to formulate strategies to reduce administrative burdens 
for enterprises in a certain policy area (useful policy instrument); 
4  to receive commitment and approval from the various authorities (politicians, rep-
resentatives of statutory organisations and representatives of employers’ organisa-
tions) in the field; 
5  to monitor the development of administrative burdens imposed by all laws and 
regulations on an annual basis.   15 
3  When to apply Mistral
®? 
3.1 Introduction 
Table 2.2 in chapter 2 illustrates that the ‘bottom-up’ approach to assess administrative 
burdens is good for ex-post assessments, ex-ante assessments and providing keys for 
solutions or alternatives. As we have seen, Mistral
® is a kind of ‘bottom-up approach’ 
 
Mistral
® can be used to assess the administrative burdens of all existing laws and regula-
tions ex-post and proposed and new laws and regulations ex-ante. There are no limits 
to the type of legislation that can be studied. Information obligations imposed on busi-
nesses are regulated mainly in administrative law. Up to the nineties the fiscal policy 
area was dominant in the research done on administrative burdens. As a consequence 
of deregulation policies, the interest in other policy areas as another source of adminis-
trative burdens for business is rising quickly. Examples of other policy areas, which cre-
ate administrative burdens for businesses, are social security, ecology, and workplace 
conditions, etcetera.  
 
In this chapter we shall discuss various applications of Mistral
®, viz. quick scans (section 
3.2), baseline measurements (section 3.3), advisory activities (section 3.4) and finally, 
the monitoring application (section 3.5). 
3.2 Quick  scans 
Should a ministry want to implement a policy to reduce administrative burdens for 
businesses, information is required to distinguish which laws and regulations create 
administrative burdens. It appears that most ministries have difficulties in gathering this 
type of information. 
 
The basic principle of Mistral
® - administrative burdens are the cost of information 
transfers - is very helpful to scan the text of a large number of different laws and regu-
lations for specific information obligations. Based on the Mistral
® principles EIM, acting 
on the instructions of Actal (Advisory Committee Testing Administrative Burden), devel-
oped a methodology to allow large volumes of policy areas to be scanned very quickly 
for information obligations for business. The quick scan method entails the following 
steps: 
1  Initial selection of relevant law items as separate parts of policy areas; 
2  Further selection based on a first text scan of the remaining law items and cluster-
ing of these items into relevant topics; 
3  Checking whether the selected law items entail information obligations for busi-
nesses (yes or no). The items classified as no are exit; 
4  Brief description of the information obligations and the business population (type 
and size) that is involved in complying with the respective information obligations; 
5  Calculating a rough estimate of the total administrative burdens of a specific law 
item for the relevant business population; 
6  Making rough estimates of total administrative burdens for different types of firms 
(e.g. small and medium-sized and large firms), with special attention for variables 
referring to the number of messages (frequencies) and fixed and variable costs; 
7  Classification of the selected law items into four categories of administrative bur-
dens: law items a) with heavy administrative burdens for businesses, b) with me-16   
dium-sized or limited administrative burdens with a significant impact on specific 
types of firms, c) with medium-sized and limited administrative burdens for busi-
nesses and finally, d) without or with very limited administrative burdens for 
businesses. 
 
As a result of the quick scan relevant, but still general, information referring to the dis-
tribution of the administrative burdens of the policy area under consideration is avail-
able about the various topics. Based on this information, EIM can advise the ministry 
that authorises the quick scan how to proceed. The next step might be a baseline 
measurement for e.g. the law items categorized under 7a) and 7b). A following step is 
necessary because the information resulting from a quick scan is too general to make 
decisions applying to a policy to reduce administrative burdens. After a quick scan we 
know which legislative items create many administrative burdens, but not why.  
 
Quick scan assessments can also be very useful when information is needed about the 
administrative burdens of proposed or new legislation. In the Netherlands, but also in 
other countries like the UK, public officers are obliged to assess - among other effects - 
the administrative burdens of intended legislation. Quick scans, as we described them, 
are part of the system called BIAS, Business Impact Assessment System. In French speak-
ing countries this instrument is called ‘Fiche d’impact’. 
3.3 Baseline  measurements 
One of Mistral’s basic features is the capability to supply accurate output at a very de-
tailed level for each article of the law individually. When and why do we need figures 
on administrative burdens at such a detailed and precise level? Basically, there are two 
situations where we need very detailed information about administrative burdens, i.e.: 
1  when policy makers want to reduce administrative burdens for business by using 
specific measures; 
2  when there is the need to set targets for the reduction of administrative burdens, 
in terms of percentages or in terms of money, to be achieved within a certain pe-
riod of time. 
 
When policy makers want to make serious efforts to reduce administrative burdens re-
lated to a specific item of law, they need to know which factors are predominant in 
causing the administrative burdens of that specific law. Is it the price of the message(s) 
or is it the quantity of the message(s), or both perhaps? And if it is the price of the mes-
sage that causes the administrative burdens, which administrative activity necessary to 
produce this specific message is responsible for this? A detailed baseline measurement 
is needed to answer these questions in a satisfying way. 
 
A government could decide to set targets to make the policy of reducing administrative 
burdens more realistic. The Dutch Cabinet did twice, in 1994 and in 1998; the target 
for the reduction of total administrative burdens for the time period 1994 to 2002 was 
set at minus 25%
1
. An annual monitoring system is needed to check whether the target 
 
1
 In 1999 a reduction of administrative burdens of only a small 6%, referred to 1994, had been 
realized (Boog, Van der Burg, Van Croonenburg en Nijsen, 1999). For 2000 a minor reduction of 
administrative burdens was realised.   17 
is being realised. The monitoring system will be explained later, but the detailed results 
of a baseline measurement are an indispensable foundation for monitoring. 
 
A baseline measurement consists of the following stages: 
1  defining the policy area or, within the policy area, the specific law in question; 
2  desk research: making a full inventory of all the information obligations, the differ-
ent messages, of businesses at the level of articles in the law; 
3  presenting the list of messages to representatives (representing all interested par-
ties) of relevant business circles and government to verify and to create support for 
the list of messages; 
4  field research: collecting time and cost parameters in face-to-face interviews with 
specialists from businesses (bookkeepers) and accountants; 
5  collecting frequency parameters (number of messages) in the relevant field; enforc-
ing institutes like tax authorities, social insurance agencies, Central Bureau of Statis-
tics, etc.; 
6  standardizing administrative activities per message, time parameters and tariffs 
(hourly wages); 
7  presentation of standardized results to experts and validation (to all interested par-
ties) in the specific field of information obligations (bookkeepers, accountants and 
experts of the enforcing institutes); 
8  input of validated parameters in Mistral
®; 
9 running  Mistral
® software to calculate the administrative burdens; 
10  presentation of the results in a report or by releasing them on a CD-Rom. 
 
The results of a baseline measurement are the administrative burdens of businesses in 
terms of money: 
a.  for the specific policy area or parts of it; 
b.  for all the separate messages within the policy area; 
c.  per message, for all the separate administrative activities. 
 
The results of a baseline measurement provide an excellent foundation to give advice 
about initiatives to reduce administrative burdens for businesses (see section 3.4) and 
for monitoring the effects of these policies (see section 3.5).  
3.4 Mistral
® as an advisory instrument 
Based on the results of baseline measurements public officers can be advised about the 
possibilities for reducing the administrative burdens in (part of) specific policy areas. An 
interesting example of the impact baseline measurements have on plans to reduce ad-
ministrative burdens is the Dutch Cabinet’s letter of May 2001 referring to the devel-
opment of the administrative burdens for the various policy areas and the action pro-
grammes of almost all departments to reduce administrative burdens on business in the 
future. Most action programmes are based on baseline measurements of the adminis-
trative burdens in specific policy areas (Letter from the Ministers of Economic and Legal 
Affairs, 2001). 
3.5 Monitoring  instrument 
Monitoring administrative burdens for businesses is meaningful only when the monitor 
focuses on the total administrative burdens at macro level for all policy areas. When a 
monitor includes only selected policy areas it is never clear what is happening in the 18   
excluded policy areas. Unknown but existing negative effects in the policy areas that 
have been excluded from the monitor might overrule positive results of a partial moni-
tor, a significant reduction of the administrative burdens for businesses.  
Do we need to repeat baseline measurements for all relevant policy areas each year? 
This would be an enormous waste of money. There is a better solution.  
The greatest strength of a baseline measurement is that all relevant parameters that 
create the administrative burdens of a specific law are available. This information is 
available at the most detailed level: per article of the law, per message and per adminis-
trative activity that is necessary to produce this message. The only information we need 
to monitor the development of the administrative burdens in the next year is about the 
parameters that have changed since the year of the baseline measurement. Desk re-
search usually suffices for monitoring the development of administrative burdens. Only 
in case of major changes in the law a new baseline measurement will be necessary.  
Since Mistral
® contains prices and quantities of messages, for monitoring we need to 
ask questions about the mutations in the prices of the messages and the frequencies of 
the messages. Both prices and frequencies might acquire different values with respect 
to the baseline year as a consequence of: 
1  changes in the law, and 
2  changes in the economy. 
 
Changes in the law are, of course, the most relevant factor when monitoring adminis-
trative burdens in order to evaluate the effects of policies aiming to reduce the adminis-
trative burdens for business. Changes in the economy refer to mutations in the number 
of businesses, the number of employees and the wage rate. In addition, prices of mes-
sages might adopt different values if there are changes in the administrative infrastruc-
ture, i.e. the percentages of outsourcing and the degree of computerization.   19 
4 Mistral
®: how does it work? 
4.1 Introduction 
We have explained why we need an instrument like Mistral
® (chapter 2) and when this 
should be applied (chapter 3). Now a more detailed explanation of the Mistral
® instru-
ment itself will be given. We will do this by describing a baseline measurement. A base-
line measurement entails all relevant elements of Mistral
®. After the presentation of 
some background information in section 4.2, section 4.3 will discuss the different in-
puts Mistral
® needs. The processing of Mistral
® will be described in section 4.4. An illus-
tration of the type of output will be given in section 4.5. 
4.2  Definitions and concepts 
Some background knowledge can be helpful to obtain a better understanding of the 
problems, which arise when measuring administrative burdens. Therefore, in this sec-
tion we will start to present some definitions and concepts in section 4.2. Subsection 
4.2.1 contains a description of the definition of administrative burdens. One important 
element of Mistral
® is the concept of standardised categories of administrative activities 
and standardised times necessary to carry out this administrative activities. This concept 
will be discussed in subsection 4.2.2. The section concludes, in subsection 4.2.3, with a 
description of CASH, the classification system of administrative activities. 
4.2.1  Definition of administrative burdens 
The cost of complying with information transfer obligations for enterprises, the so-
called administrative burdens, can be divided into structural or regular (annual) and 
one-off costs. 
 
Structural administrative burdens are the integral costs of the annually recurring admin-
istrative activities connected to complying with the obligation to transfer information, 
as specifically stipulated in the regulation applying to businesses operating in a specific 
country to the government or comparable body of that country, which obligations busi-
nesses cannot ignore without offending against the law. The government or compara-
ble body of that specific country uses the information thus obtained to check and main-
tain compliance with content obligations deemed by society to be of value. 
The definition of one-off administrative burdens is identical to that of structural admin-
istrative burdens, as long as it is remembered that this applies only to situations in 
which there are major changes to existing laws and regulations, or new laws and regu-
lations (Nijsen, 2000: 104-105). 
 
Administrative burdens consist of: 
a.  the cost components: 
-  wage/salary costs and/or the assessed wage of the entrepreneur 
-  cost of the computers, software, etc. used 
-  allowance for overheads; 
when the businesses themselves execute the transfer of information; 
b.  the cost of out-sourcing, if the businesses out-source the execution of the transfer 
of information (Nijsen, 2000: 104). 
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Administrative burdens are the costs of legally obliged information transfers from busi-
nesses to government or enforcing institutes and vice versa. Information transfers are 
called messages and the number of messages, required in a year, is called the fre-
quency. Administrative burdens exist simply because producing messages takes time 
and money. This concept is the basic principle of Mistral
® and will be elaborated in a 
more technical way (formulas) in chapter 5. 
4.2.2  Standardised administrative activities 
One of the features of the Mistral
® methodology is the concept of the so-called stan-
dardised administrative activities. Why do we need such a concept when assessing the 
administrative burdens of businesses? 
 
Administrative burdens are influenced by exogenous as well as endogenous determi-
nants. Individual businesses could not influence exogenous determinants, but they 
could do so regards the endogenous ones (Allers, 1994; Nijsen, 2000; Verwaal, 2000). 
Exogenous determinants are primarily law related and endogenous determinants are 
primarily related to internal processes of businesses. Examples of exogenous determi-
nants are the decision process in Parliament to issue information obligations for busi-
nesses, the design of these obligations, differences in definitions between policy areas, 
changes in regulations etcetera. Examples of endogenous determinants are the degree 
of efficiency of business administrations, the choice to hire extremely expensive external 
advisors, the decision not to comply with information obligations etcetera (Allers, 1994; 
Nijsen, 2000). 
 
To detect and avoid undue administrative burdens is the main objective of research and 
accompanying policy related to administrative burdens. It is important to realise that 
administrative burdens are relevant in terms of policy only when they are undue from 
the point of view of the law. Or, in other words, only in those cases where the undue 
administrative burdens are exogenous from the point of view of the individual firm. 
Undue endogenous administrative burdens, the consequence of inefficiencies at firm 
level, are irrelevant in this respect.  
 
To make sure the focus of Mistral
® is on exogenous determinants, firstly we have cho-
sen the methodology of standardisation of administrative activities when carrying out 
specific information obligations. Standardisation of administrative activities implies that, 
for each separate information obligation, a blue print is being made of how to deal 
with the administrative requirements of this obligation. Experts, such as bookkeepers 
and accountants or other specialists, involved in carrying out the specific information 
obligation are consulted when making these blue prints of standardised administrative 
activities. Secondly, based on expert interviews, the time necessary to carry out every 
separate administrative activity is being standardised according to ‘average efficient 
practice’. The data resulting from these steps - standardising activities and time neces-
sary per activity - are registered in CASH. For an explanation of CASH, see next subsec-
tion. 
4.2.3  Classification System Administrative Activities (CASH) 
CASH, is the acronym of Classification system of AdminiStrative Activities (Activities are 
‘Handelingen’ in Dutch). The basic idea of CASH is that administrative activities are of a 
rather generic nature. They are not very specific for policy areas, information obliga-
tions, and messages and not for enterprises in different industries or different size clas-
ses. The processes of becoming acquainted with what information government needs, 
gathering this information, asking for advice, making calculations and checking them,   21 
them, filling in documents, sending them to government or enforcing institutes, filing 
documents etcetera are rather similar for most policy areas and enterprises. What dif-
fers is the time the different administrative activities take, depending on the type of 
activity. In general, obtaining advice takes much more time than filing a document. An-
other important difference between the various types of administrative activities is the 
qualification level that is needed to carry out the specific activities. Checking calcula-
tions needs more expertise then filing or sending a document. So the necessary time 
and qualification level may vary for different administrative activities. 
 
Based on various Mistral
® projects, EIM compiled the database CASH containing many 
administrative activities, including the time needed for each activity necessary to pro-
duce the various messages in the different policy areas. Today, this database contains 
thousands of different administrative activities, all of which have been clustered into 
fourteen basic administrative activities as shown in table 4.1. Analyses have indicated 
that within the fourteen categories the variations in time necessary to carry out this 
specific administrative activity were considerable. To acquire more homogenous catego-
ries of administrative activities, we added the dimension simple, average and compli-
cated for each activity. 
Table 4.1  Administrative activities according to CASH by category of complexity 
(in round minutes) 
No. Description  Simple Average Complicated 
1  Becoming/remaining familiar with the information obliga-
tion 1  10  21 
2  Receiving the information  1  2  3 
3  Collecting the required information  1  6  19 
4  Judging whether the information obligation is applicable  2  6  15 
5  Filling in or entering the required information  1  5  9 
6  Making calculations or assessments  2  5  12 
7  Printing out the results of the calculation  0  3  5 
8  Checking and possibly correcting the results  1  12  69 
9 Obtaining  advice  2  20  100 
10 Consultation  0  10  34 
11 Explanation  1  14  54 
12  Executing the instructions to pay  1  4  5 
13  Sending the information, the message  1  1  5 
14  Filing the data  1  2  2 
Source: EIM. 
If, for various reasons, field research is not necessary or not possible, CASH can facili-
tate research on administrative burdens. By consulting CASH, new messages can be 
built, including the necessary administrative activities and the time needed to carry 
them out. 22   
4.3  Input of the model 
To use Mistral
® for a baseline measurement the following inputs are required: 
1  a precise description of the relevant policy area, for instance, the social insurances 
for employees;  
2  the percentage of business outsourcing the compliance of the obligations for busi-
nesses of this specific policy area and the degree of computerization;
1 
3  a detailed list of validated information obligations for businesses by relevant article 
of the policy area of pay roll tax. These information obligations are called messages 
e.g. the annual statements for each individual employee;
2  
4  For every single message, the validated number of times the message has to be sent 
all year round (monthly, quarterly, annually or depending on some event like hiring 
or firing). This is the so called the ‘periodicity’ of a message;  
5  For each single message the number of entities sending that specific message in all 
relevant industries on an annual base. For instance, in the annual statement for 
each single employee, the number of entities equals all employment for all firms in 
all relevant industries in a specific year. The number of entities multiplied with the 
periodicity (see 4) is called the frequency of a message; 
6  For each single message, a detailed and validated description of the standardised 
administrative activities necessary to produce this message; 
7  For each single administrative activity necessary to produce a specific message, the 
validated necessary time in minutes and validated hourly wage rate, depending on 
the qualification levels. 
4.4  Processing the model 
Once the input data have been collected, the software of Mistral
® executes the neces-
sary calculation processes.  
 
Mistral
® runs two separate calculations for each single policy area; one for all the mes-
sages sent by the businesses themselves and one for all the messages outsourced by the 
businesses. In each single policy area weighting with the percentage of outsourcing 
combines the results of these two separate calculations. The following description of 
the calculation procedure applies both for businesses that send messages themselves 
and also the messages that are outsourced. 
 
Mistral
® starts the calculation of the administrative burdens of a specific policy area from 
the bottom, at the level of every single administrative activity (see chart 2). Each single 
administrative activity belongs to a specific message. For every single administrative ac-
tivity we know the frequency, the necessary time in minutes and the tariff. By multiply-
ing quantity (frequencies) x price (time x tariff) the administrative burdens of each single 
message are calculated in terms of money. Adding up the administrative burdens, in 
term of money, for all the messages in the specific policy area gives as result the total 
administrative burdens of that policy area. The next step is to combine the administra-
tive burdens, in terms of money, for all separate policy areas to one macro figure that 
represents the aggregate administrative burdens for all policy areas together. 
 
1
 In items 3-7 the same holds both for businesses that comply themselves and for businesses outsour-
cing compliance with the obligations. 
2
 In some cases there may be sub-messages e.g. a special item in the annual statement which is not 
applicable for each individual employee. All remarks related to messages hold for sub-messages too.   23 
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4.5  Output of the model 
Table 4.2 shows a dummy, demonstrating the type of results a regular baseline meas-
urement that Mistral
® will produce. Most striking is the detailed level of the results. For 
each message there is information available about the pattern of administrative activi-
ties necessary to produce that specific message. Also available per administrative activity 
are the number of entities, the periodicity, the necessary time and the tariff depending 
on qualification. Based on this information the administrative burden per activity is pro-
vided and, using addition also the administrative burdens for every single message. To 
calculate the administrative burdens for an entire policy area or for all policy areas to-
gether is only a small final step in the total calculation of Mistral
®. These detailed results 
provide an excellent foundation for making policy to reduce administrative burdens and 
to monitor the results of such types of policy.   25 
Dummy: Table 4.2 Administrative burdens by policy area 
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5  Description of Mistral
® in detail 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains a technical description of the way in which the (financial) adminis-
trative burden private businesses have to bear is calculated within the framework of 
Mistral
®. Mistral
® gives an estimate of how the administrative burden of private busi-
nesses varies between policy areas. The equations for determining the administrative 
burden are presented in sections 5.2 and 5.3. Section 5.4 describes various ways in 
which the administrative burden can be presented. Finally, Annex I lists all variables 
used in these sub-sections. 
5.2  Decomposition into a number of messages 
In broad lines we can distinguish two steps in determining the administrative burden 
imposed upon private businesses. First, it is determined how many ‘messages’ are nec-
essary to comply with all information obligations stated in the law. Subsequently, in the 
next section, the costs per message are determined. 
 
Dutch legislation comprises various policy areas. For each of these policy areas  p  the 
level of administrative burden  p AB can be determined. The total level of administrative 












This is the total level of administrative burden in the Netherlands. The level of the ad-
ministrative burden for a policy area is the cost of all the obligations set forth in that 
particular policy area. Assume that there are  po n  obligations in policy area  p . The ad-
ministrative burden of the 
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The cost of obligation o is the sum of the costs of all messages associated with this ob-
ligation that have to be sent to the government. It is assumed that there are  pom n  mes-
sages




 Some of the messages are composed of sub-messages. Not every obligation has the same conse-
quences for all businesses. In that case we have sub-messages with differing costs expressing these 
differences. The cost of a sub-message is determined in the same way as the cost of a message in 
the main text. As a result, the cost of a message with sub-messages is then the sum of the cost of 
all sub-messages. This element is ignored in the main text to make the description not unnecessarily 
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5.3  Decomposition of the costs of a message 
The cost of message m due to obligation o in policy area  p , is: 
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It is assumed that we have  poma n  activities associated with message m . Composing a 
message is the result of a number of administrative activities. These include gathering 
the requested information, typing a document containing the information, sending the 
document to the government and finally, making a copy of the document to file it for 
future reference.  
 
The internal and external cost of message m  is the product of the number of times the 
activity is carried out, multiplied by the time required to carry out the activity and fi-
nally, multiplied by the appropriate tariff in terms of money per minute of the person 
carrying out the activity. The constituent parts of these equations are discussed in the 
following sub-paragraphs. 
5.3.1  Proportion of outsourcing 
Some businesses prefer to outsource part or all of these activities. Small businesses lack 
for instance the qualified personnel to perform certain (administrative) tasks. The per-
sonnel working for this business are mainly engaged in the core activity of the business, 
which can be quite different from an administrative activity. In that case, it is likely to 
be cheaper to hire an external expert, who can then perform the necessary tasks. We 
end up with two types of costs, the internal cost for those activities that are carried out 
within the business and the external cost which constitute the payments made by pri-
vate businesses towards other businesses performing the outsourced activities. For each 
activity we introduce the proportion of outsourcing  poma  . The value of  poma   will be 
close to one for policy areas, which mainly affect mainly small businesses. Larger busi-
nesses will have specialized personal to carry out these activities and the  poma  -value 
for policy areas influencing mainly larger firms will be close to zero. There are also ar-
guments for smaller firms to outsource to a larger extent even if it is more expensive 
than having someone within their own businesses to carry out this task. It relieves the 
entrepreneur of the burden of filling out forms for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). It   29 
also relieves him of the burden of doing this without making any mistakes that could 
otherwise lead to legal steps by the IRS. 
5.3.2  Frequency 
Each activity is carried out  poma Frequency  times a year and therefore, the number of 
times the activity is carried out within the firm is one minus the proportion of outsourc-
ing times the frequency. The number of times the activity is carried out by an outside 
business is the proportion of outsourcing times the frequency.  
 
The frequency itself is dependent on the so-called periodicity and number of reporting 
entities. The periodicity is the number of times per year a message has to be sent to the 
government. For instance, once a year or every quarter year, so four times a year. These 
messages have to be sent by each business itself, or for each employee working in that 
business. The reporting entities are respectively, all businesses that have to send the 
message or all employees for whom this message has to be send. The number of busi-
nesses or employees is then the number of reporting entities. By multiplying the perio-
dicity by the number of reporting entities: 
 
poma poma poma tities NumberOfEn y Periodicit Frequency    
 
we arrive at the frequency, or total number of messages that have to be send to the 
government in a particular year. 
5.3.3  Internal and External Time 
It takes  poma me InternalTi  minutes to carry out this particular activity if it is done within 
the business itself. An outside business performs the same activity in  poma me ExternalTi  
minutes. 
5.3.4  Internal and External Time 
The internal tariff for the activity when it is executed within the business itself is the 
amount of money per hour, divided by 60. This tariff is denoted by  poma riff InternalTa . 
The external tariff is  poma riff ExternalTa  and it is the tariff when the activity is out-
sourced. The internal tariff is the labour cost including a percentage for overhead costs. 
The labour cost is composed of the gross wage rate of the person carrying out the 
activity and a number of surcharges. Surcharges comprise paid holidays, all sorts of 
emoluments, pension contributions, etc. The percentages used for each of the sur-
charges are based on wage cost research conducted by EIM based of CBS-material. EIM 
has adapted the material to up-date the CBS material. When outsourcing is preferred, 
the going rate for hiring outside help is normally higher than the wage rate if the activ-
ity were carried out within the business. 
5.4  Presenting the level of administrative burden 
The administrative burden for all policy areas or one particular policy area can be pre-
sented as the total level of the administrative burden in terms of money,  AB , respec-
tively as  p AB . The total level of the administrative burden can also be presented as a  30   
percentage of total value added valued at factor costs (VA): 
 





Presenting it this way makes clear what part of value added is used to comply with in-
formation obligations by the industries involved. It may even be presented for each pos-
sible combination of size class and industry.   31 
6  Breakdown into industries and size classes 
6.1 Introduction 
Having determined the overall level of administrative burden for the various policy ar-
eas, it is interesting to find the answers to the questions: what is the administrative 
burden for businesses within a certain industry and within a certain size class? How are 
businesses in the various industries of the economy affected? Is the size class to which 
the firm belongs also important concerning the level of the administrative burden it has 
to bear?  
 
The determination of the level of administrative burden as described in chapters 4 and 5 
is a methodology to assess results at a macro level, i.e. the administrative burden per 
policy area. Data are collected at activity level to determine the cost of an administrative 
action. The administrative burden is the sum of the cost of all administrative activities. 
The data collected to perform these calculations are representative data for all busi-
nesses involved. Researchers weigh, for instance, the internal tariffs they have collected 
to arrive at a representative internal tariff.  
 
In addition to the macro approach, a special feature of Mistral
® is the breakdown of the 
macro results into size class and industry. Three size classes are considered in Mistral: 
businesses with no or up to ten employees, between ten and a hundred employees, and 
hundred or more employees. Within the fourteen industries that are being considered 
we have fifty-two size class and industry combinations. Following the bottom-up ap-
proach researchers would have to estimate, for all activities within a certain policy area, 
the data needed to perform the calculations for all fifty-two combinations. It is clear 
that this would dramatically increases the cost of carrying out such research.  
 
In this chapter we use a different approach. The level of administrative burden for a 
certain policy area will be divided among industries and size classes in order to achieve 
at results at meso level. This division is made taking into account differences between 
businesses active in various industries and of various size classes. The approach is de-
scribed as having three steps. The first step is to breakdown the administrative burden 
based on what entity is affected primarily by the legislation for each policy area - busi-
nesses or employees, for instance. Based on the distribution of these entities over the 
size classes and industries that are considered, we have a first rough estimate of the 
administrative burden for each size class and industry combination. Then there is also 
information about the size class and industry combinations that are not, or to a lesser, 
extent affected by legislation in a particular policy area because of the specific scope of 
that legislation. In the second step using this information improves the estimate made 
in the previous step. In the third step we consider differences in internal and external 
rates and tariffs, proportions of outsourcing and internal and external times, between 
size class and industry combinations to improve the estimate obtained in the second 
step even further.  
 
As in the previous chapter we can present, in an additional step, the extent of the ad-
ministrative burden for each size class and industry combination as either an amount of 
money or as a percentage of the value added for that particular size class and industry 
combination. The steps regarding the breakdown into industries and size classes are 
discussed in detail in the following sections. The demonstration of the breakdown ef-32   
fects of the different steps is founded on baseline measurements i.e. the administrative 
burdens for selected policy areas (section 6.2). 
6.2  Baseline measurement selected policy areas: bottom-up approach 
We start with the baseline measurements for six selected policy areas. The policy areas 
involved are the payroll tax including specific general insurances connected to payroll 
tax, employees’ social insurances, income tax, corporate and dividend tax, VAT and fi-
nally, the Annual Accounts. These policy areas account for about 50% of total adminis-
trative burdens of all policy areas in the Netherlands. Table 6.1 shows the administrative 
burdens borne by businesses to comply with the transfer of information obligations 
applying in these specific policy areas. In 2000 the administrative burdens for these six 
policy areas amounted to over 4 billion euros. Annual Accounts proved to be the most 
burdensome policy area; corporate and dividend tax imposed fewest burdens. 
 
Table 6.1   Administrative burdens on businesses for selected policy areas in the 
Netherlands, 2000, euros (x 1,000,000) 
Policy area   
Payroll tax and general social insurances*    722 
Employees social insurances    630 
Income tax   444 
Corporate and dividend tax    248 
VAT   673 
Annual Accounts   1,623 
Total   4,341 
* Retirement, widows and orphans pension schemes, General Health insurance. 
These administrative burdens were determined bottom-up without taking size class and 
industry differences into account, except when estimating representative numbers for 
the proportion of outsourcing, internal and external rates and tariffs, for all size class 
and industry combinations.  
 
To make the various steps taken in the next sections easier to understand table 6.2 illus-
trates the way in which entities are influenced by the various policy areas.    33 
Table 6.2   Administrative burdens incurred in 2000 due to statutory info-transfer 
obligations in selected olicy domains 















Payroll tax and general social 
insurances*    722  72**    650  -   - 
Employees social insurances    630  63**    567    -    - 
Income  tax    444  -    -   444   - 
Corporate tax and dividend tax    248  -    -    -    248 
VAT    673  673    -  -   - 
Annual  account    1,623  -    -  -   1,623 
Total    4,341  808    1,217   444   1,872 
* Retirement, widows and orphans pension schemes, general health insurance. 
** Only enterprises with employees. 
From table 6.2 it appears that the policy areas payroll tax and employees’ social insur-
ances impose administrative burdens only on enterprises with employees. Only self-
employed have to comply with the information obligations of the policy area income 
tax. This means that all administrative burdens applying to this specific policy area are 
imposed only on this category, not to corporate firms. Corporate and dividend tax and 
the Annual Accounts, on the contrary, affect only to corporate firms. Finally, the infor-
mation obligations of policy area VAT are relevant to all enterprises. To conclude, for a 
corporate firm with employees the administrative burdens are particularly severe, when 
the six policy areas mentioned earlier are considered. 
6.3 First  approximation: entities affected 
Based on the distribution of the entities ( mentioned in section 6.2) among the size 
classes and industries under consideration, we arrive at a first rough estimate of the 
administrative burden for each size class and industry combination. To some extent this 
step looks more closely at the number of the different entities for all size class and in-
dustry combinations (see Annex II) instead of one representative figure for each entity 
of all the businesses involved. See table 6.3. 34   
Table 6.3   Administrative burdens for businesses in selected policy areas accord-
ing to size class and industry, according to entities (first stage); the 
Netherlands, 2000, euros (x 1,000,000) 
Industry  Small firms  Medium sized firms  Large firms  Total 
Agriculture   255    4    1    260 
Mining   3    1    2    6 
Manufacturing   216    175    128    519 
Electricity, water, gas    1    1    9    10 
Building   259    137    35    431 
Repair and trade    758    236    113   1,107 
Hotel, catering    162    42    14    218 
Transport, communication    122    73    64    259 
Financing, insurance    105    19    56    180 
Real estate, business to business    779    138    174   1,091 
Health and welfare    132    17    81    230 
Culture, sports and broadcasting, TV    25    3    1    29 
All private industries    2,816    846    678   4,341 
 
From table 6.3 it appears that as a preliminary result of the first step, small firms (0-9 
employees) are affected most by the administrative burdens of the selected six policy 
areas; 65% of 4.341 million euros. The percentages for the medium sized (10-99 em-
ployees) and the large firms are 19 and 16 respectively. These results are easy to under-
stand. As shown in table 6.2, 90% of total administrative burdens is related to the enti-
ties enterprise, self-employed and corporate firms. Only 10% of the total administrative 
burden is employees related. Since most firms are small ones (92%) and almost all self-
employed are small firms, the greater part of administrative burdens is imposed on 
small firms. 
 
When considering industries, 50% of total administrative burdens are borne by just two 
small-scaled industries i.e. repair and trade, and real estate, business-to-business ser-
vices. The most relevant explanation for this is that a relatively large share (46%) of all 
firms and self-employed (40%) are located in these two industries. In addition almost 
59% of all corporate firms and 44% of all employees belong to these two industries.  
 
But more elements will need to be considered to obtain a better assessment of the 
breakdown of administrative burdens into industries and size classes. The next step cor-
rects for the scope of policy areas (see section 6.4). 
6.4  Correction for scope of policy area  
This second step improves the estimate made in the first step by considering how busi-
nesses in the various size class and industry combinations are affected by the scope of 
the legislation. This is done at the level of information obligations. One can assume that 
some businesses are affected by legislation because of their size or because they have 
more than a minimal number of employees. Other businesses are not affected by that 
same piece of legislation. The corresponding number of entities of the information obli-  35 
gations involved for these businesses for that particular size class and industry combina-
tion is set equal to zero. Positive number of entities are found only for those size class 
and industry combinations that meet the requirements as described within the legisla-
tion of that policy area or can be deduced using common sense. In this step, therefore, 
the level of administrative burden to comply with each information obligation is broken 
down into size class and industry combinations, based on the number of entities for all 
size class and industry combinations, and on the scopes of the various policy areas. 
Table 6.4   Administrative burdens on businesses in selected policy areas according 
to size class and industry, based on entities and scope of regulation 
(second stage); the Netherlands, 2000, euros  
(x 1,000, 000) 
Industry  Small firms  Medium sized firms  Large firms  Total 
Agriculture   193    5    2    199 
Mining   2   1    2    5 
Manufacturing   335    238    247    820 
Electricity, water, gas   0   1    10    11 
Building   189    148    66    403 
Repair and trade   813    252    148  1,213 
Hotel, catering   125    41    19    184 
Transport, communication    91    73    81    244 
Financing, insurance    78    18    55    151 
Real estate, business to business    567    134    197    898 
Health and welfare    96    15    76    187 
Culture, sports and broadcasting, TV    20    3    1    24 
All private industries    2,510    929    902  4,341 
 
The preliminary results of stage 2 (table 6.4) differ from those of stage one. Firstly, ad-
ministrative burdens for small firms dropped by 11% (from 2.816 million euros to 2.510 
euros). This is the balanced result of a reduction of administrative burdens by about 23-
27% for all small firms, except small firms in manufacturing (+ 55%; from 216 to 335 
million euros) and small firms in repair and trade sector (+ 7%; from 758 to 813 million 
euros).As a consequence, the administrative burdens went up in the medium-sized (+ 
10%; from 846 to 929 million euros) and especially in the large firms (+ 33%; from 678 
to 902 billion euros). Most striking are the changes in administrative burdens for the 
large firms in manufacturing (+ 93%; from 128 to 247 million euros) and in the build-
ing sector (+ 87%; from 35 to 66 million euros). The main explanation for this shift in 
administrative burdens among industries and size classes is the appearance of industry 
specific employee-related information obligations belonging to the policy areas of pay-
roll tax and employees’ social insurances. In complying with the information obligations 
of these two policy areas enterprises have to perform many administrative activities for 
“special allowances”. Examples of such types of remuneration are allowances for shift 
work, guard duties, inconvenient and/or dangerous work and wages- in- kind. Manu-
facturing firms, especially the large ones, are within the scope of all these particular 
types of information obligations. In addition, special allowances are rather common in 36   
the building and transport sectors and the health sector. Additional, industry- specific 
employee related information obligations are applicable in the building sector, for in-
stance information obligations related to loss of working hours due to bad weather 
conditions. 
6.5  Corrections for differences in rates and tariffs  
To improve even further the estimate obtained in the previous stage the final step takes 
into account differences in internal and external rates and tariffs between size class and 
industry combinations due to outsourcing. Most small firms lack the expertise to per-
form the administrative activities connected to the information obligations of most pol-
icy areas and therefore they outsource this administration. Rates for outsourced admin-
istrative activities differ from internal rates. In most cases, external tariffs are higher 
than internal rates. This means that the administrative burdens of outsourced informa-
tion obligations are more costly than the administrative burdens of activities undertaken 
internally. On the other hand, labour costs in small firms are lower than labour costs in 
large firms. This implies that the internal tariffs in small businesses are lower than the 
internal tariffs in larger businesses. Besides, internal and external rates differ according 
to policy area. More experience is needed for administrative activities when preparing 
the Annual Accounts, for instance, than for activities connected with payroll tax. Refer 
to Annex III for more detailed information about percentages of outsourcing and tariffs. 
 
Tariff correction is based on a number of assumptions. First it is assumed that the cost 
of each individual administrative activity is the same for all activities within a certain 
policy area. Furthermore, it is assumed that the cost of administrative activities is the 
same for all businesses within a certain size class and industry combination. Because 
there are only rough estimates about, for instance, the proportion of outsourcing for 
the three size classes that are considered within this research, it should be understood 
that the estimate of the administrative burden is improved only at the level of all indus-
tries. There is no estimate that also considers the fourteen industries. Furthermore, we 
consider the administrative burden only at the highest level, the policy area. The error 
made will be small compared to performing these calculations at information obligation 
level, because it is assumed that all activities are comparable. An additional benefit is 
that this reduces the number of calculations considerably. It is questionable whether 
performing these calculations at a lower level would improve the results obtained. Any 
improvement would be artificial as we lack information on this subject. 
 
When correcting for the differences in rates and tariffs, it is assumed that the calcula-
tions performed in a previous step used a tariff that is the same for all businesses within 
the various size class combinations. The level of administrative burden is first divided by 
this tariff and then the administrative burden for a certain size class is re-calculated us-
ing a tariff that is specific for that particular size class. In determining the tariff for each 
of the size classes under consideration, differences in rates of outsourcing and differ-
ences in internal and external tariffs between size classes are taken into account. 
 
The following tables show the varying degrees of outsourcing (table 6.5) and the vari-
ous rates and tariffs (table 6.6).   37 
Table 6.5   Percentages for degrees of outsourcing according to policy area and size 








Payroll tax and general social insurances*    85    30    10    80 
Employees social insurances    85    30    10    80 
Income tax    90    90    90    90 
Corporate tax and dividend tax    87    70    30    85 
VAT   0    0    0    0 
Annual account    67    50    20    65 
* Retirement, widows and orphans pension schemes, general health insurance. 
 
Table 6.6   Average tariffs* for administrative activities per policy area in the Neth-







enterprises  Total 
 internal  tariffs 
Payroll tax and general social insurances**    29.50    29.50    33.12  31.76 
Employees social insurances    29.50    29.50    33.12  31.76 
Income tax    29.50    36.30    54.45  29.49 
Corporate tax and dividend tax    29.50    36.30    54.45  38.57 
VAT   29.50    40.84    63.52  31.76 
Annual account    29.50    36.30    81.67  45.37 
   External  tariffs     
Payroll tax and general social insurances*    32.67    43.10    63.52  39.02 
Employees social insurances    32.67    43.10    63.52  39.02 
Income tax    56.72    68.06    79.40  56.72 
Corporate tax and dividend tax    61.25    90.74  136.12  69.87 
VAT   -    -   -    - 
Annual account    77.13    113.43  181.49  90.74 
*   Labour costs inclusive overhead costs. 
**  Retirement, widows and orphans pension schemes, general health insurance. 
It appears that, as a result of the correction for differences in degree of outsourcing and 
differences in internal and external tariffs, the preliminary results of stage 2 (see table 
6.4) change again. The administrative burdens for small firms decrease on average by 
8%, whereas medium-sized and large firms show an average increase of administrative 
burdens of respectively 5 and 17%. The final results will be shown in section 6.6 and 
again in more detail in chapter 7. These effects are the balanced results of: 
 The higher degree of outsourcing for the small firms on the one hand and; 
 The lower internal and external tariffs for small firms on the other hand, compared 
to medium-sized and large firms. 38   
6.6 Evaluation 
Table 6.7 contains the results of all three stages. The most important result of the three 
correction stages is that the administrative burdens shifted from the small firms not only 
to the medium-sized, but in particular to the large enterprises. This shift is caused 
mainly by two factors. Firstly, and that is demonstrated in the second stage, employee 
related industry specific information obligations regarding special allowances are par-
ticularly burdensome for large manufacturing enterprises. Secondly, the higher internal 
and external tariffs result in higher administrative burdens for the large firms. 
Table 6.7   Administrative burdens for businesses in selected policy areas accord-
ing to size class, entities, scope of regulations and tariffs; the Nether-








   euros     
First approximation: entities affected    2,816    846    678    4,341 
Second stage: correction for scope    2,510    929    902    4,341 
Third stage: correction for tariffs: final 
results   2,307    978   1,056    4,341 
   Ratios     
First approximation: entities affected   0.65   0.19   0.16    1.00 
Second stage: correction for scope    0.58    0.22    0.20    1.00 
Third stage: correction for tariffs: final 
results   0.53   0.23   0.24    1.00 
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7  Some results obtained using Mistral
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains some results obtained by using Mistral
®. This demonstration starts 
by presenting the macro results of a baseline measurement of just one policy area i.e. 
employees’ social insurances. The next section discusses the policy area employees’ so-
cial insurances and the way in which the administrative burden is determined bottom-
up. There is no distinction within this description between size classes and industries. 
This section parallels Chapter 5. In section 7.3 the meso results of the six selected policy 
areas are described for each size class and industry combination (as discussed in Chap-
ter 6).  
7.2  Macro results policy area employees’ social insurances  
7.2.1  Introduction 
Employees’ social insurances are related to the risks of loss of income the consequence 
of unemployment, sickness (short term disablement of one year) and long-term dis-
ablement (unable to work, more than one year). Every employer has to comply with 
many transfer of information obligations within the framework of this policy area. In 
sub-section 7.2.2 the administrative burdens of all related messages will be discussed. 
Sub-section 7.2.3 concentrates on the administrative burden of just one message ‘in-
spection by enforcing institutions’. In the same sub-section the way Mistral
® calculates 
the effects of a certain policy to reduce administrative burdens will be explained. 
 
The administrative burdens shown in this section were determined bottom-up, as de-
scribed in chapter 5, without taking size class and industry differences into account 
except for estimating representative numbers for the proportion of outsourcing, internal 
and external tariffs etc. for all size class and industry combinations.  
 
It is also important to emphasise that the administrative activities of the policy area em-
ployees’ social insurances are highly interwoven with other administrative activities of a 
related policy area i.e. the payroll tax. In the Netherlands employers have to transfer 
payroll tax deducted from their employees to the Tax Authorities. But, deducted em-
ployees’ social insurances should be transferred to special employees’ social insurance 
institutions. As a consequence there are two different information flows originating 
from one highly interwoven administrative process in the enterprises: one to the social 
insurance institutions and one to the Tax Authorities. In order to avoid double counting 
the administrative burdens of these two closely related policy areas, 50% of the total 
administrative burdens of the two policy areas combined has been allocated to the pol-
icy area employees’ social insurances and the other 50% to the policy area payroll tax. 
This reallocation of administrative burden is confined to the messages related to admin-
istrative activities referring to starting up or ending the deduction of taxes and contribu-
tions and to the payment of taxes and contributions. 
7.2.2  Administrative burdens per message 
Table 7.1 contains figures of the administrative burdens related to the policy area em-
ployees’ social insurances. Total administrative burdens were 878.1 million euros in 
2000. Which items of the employees’ social insurances cause most of the administrative 40   
burdens within this policy area? A closer look at the figures shows that messages re-
lated to the payment of contributions (part B) account for almost 68% of all administra-
tive burdens, viz. 596.5 million euros. Another important category of messages is re-
lated to the payment of benefits (part C); 29% or 258.2 million euros. Messages related 
to starting up or ending the deduction of contributions are responsible for the rest of 
the administrative burdens; only a small 3% or 23.5 million euros. 
Table 7.1   Administrative burdens for businesses resulting from employees’ social 
insurances per message in the Netherlands, 2000,  
euros (x 1,000,000) 
Code Message  euros 
 All  messages  878.1 
A  Start/end deduction contributions* 23.5 
A.0  TOTAL information payroll tax enforcing institution employees’ social insur-
ances  6.8 
A.1  TOTAL application for connection number  3.2 
A.2  TOTAL ending obligation to deduct contributions   13.4 
B  Payment of contributions*  596.5 
B.1  Total reporting duty employees’ social insurances  26.2 
B.2  Total wage records  46.9 
B.3 Special  allowances  112.9 
B.4 Special  remunerations  65.8 
B.5  Taxable allowances   40.8 
B.6  Wage in kind  22.4 
B.7   Non- taxable allowances and supplies  173.9 
B.8/9  Payment of contributions employees’ social insurances  82.7 
B.10  Total retrospective assessment  8.1 
B.11  Total payment contribution disablement of self-employed (WAZ)**  14.6 
B.12  Total inspection enforcing institutions  2.2 
C  Payments of benefits  258.2 
C.1  Messages related to sickness (ZW, WULBZ)  200.3 
C.2  Messages related to disability to work (WAO, WAZ)  22.1 
C.3  Messages related to unemployment (WW)  26.9 
C.4  Messages related to (Re)integration of the Worked Disabled Act (REA)  8.8 
*  50% of all administrative burdens of the related administrative activities. The other 50% is allo-
cated to the policy area payroll tax. 
**  Strictly speaking the WAZ is not part of employees’ social insurances. 
Source: Boog, Nijsen, Regter en Suyver, 2001. 
Part B, administrative activities related to the payment of contributions, is responsible 
for the larger part of all administrative burdens in this policy area. Which messages are 
responsible? A closer look shows that, in the case of employees’ social insurances, most 
administrative burdens originate from the complexity of the legislation. Some elements 
of remuneration are taxable others are not. And the taxable remunerations are taxable   41 
at different rates. Because of this, employers must register all these different elements 
of remuneration. For instance, the message related to special allowances (B.3) involves 
112.9 million euros. Special allowances are relevant, for instances, in the case of the 
sub-messages overtime, irregularity, shift work, and loss of working hours due bad 
weather conditions etc. Message B.4, special remuneration, is also accompanied by 
heavy administrative burdens. Examples of special remunerations are the sub-messages 
holiday allowances, premiums and bonus etc. Also important are the administrative 
burdens incurred by message B.5,taxable allowances and supplies. This message refers, 
for instance, to the sub-messages reimbursements of travelling costs, telephone and 
clothing expenses etc. Finally, message B.7 - non-taxable allowances and supplies - in-
curs 173.9 million euros in administrative burdens. Examples of this type of allowances 
are the sub-messages reimbursements of costs for coffee, meals, training, seminars, 
books, and removal, etc.  
 
Payment of benefits related messages create administrative burdens of 258.2 million 
euros, as can be seen in table 7.1. Especially, messages related to sickness of employees 
are very burdensome, 200.3 million euros. Reporting sickness and recovery by employ-
ers happens about 20 million times (frequency) a year.  
7.2.3  Administrative burden of one selected message 
Mistral
® produces information in great detail. To demonstrate this one message, B12 
inspection by enforcing institutions, has been selected from table 7.1. This message 
refers to the employers’ compliance with transfer of information obligations by allowing 
inspectors to visit their firms in order to check whether all obligations related to the 
policy area employees’ social insurances are complied with. 
Table 7.2 shows that the frequency of the annual number of inspections is approxi-
mately 20,000. This means that in 2000 about 20,000 employers had to receive an in-
spector from one of the employees’ social insurance institutions (or the Tax Authority).
1 
It also indicates that 80% of all employers outsources the administrative of employees’ 
social insurances, it would take longer to do it themselves even though it would be 
cheaper as internal rates are lower than outsourcing tariffs. Answering questions posed 
by inspectors and acting as intermediary with external contacts prove to be a particu-
larly heavy burden. 
 
Information at this detailed level allows policy to be initiated to reduce administrative 
burdens. What, for instance, would be the effect of a reduction of the number of in-
spections by 50%, because the inspectors could obtain some of the necessary informa-
tion elsewhere, from the Tax Authorities, for example? Table 7.3 demonstrates the ef-
fects of such a policy measure showing that this would result in reducing the adminis-
trative burdens by 53%. 
 
1
 From 2002 onwards there is only one employees’ social insurance institution, the UWV. 42   
Table 7.2   Administrative burden of message ‘inspection of employees’ social insurance administration by enforcing institutions’ (message B.12) in the private sector 








time in  
minutes 
Doing self 
euros per hour 
Doing self  
burden in  
mln. euros 
Outsourced 









den in  
mln. euros 
Collecting the required information    20861    80    23    31.56    0.05  7.7    39.45    0.08    0.13 
Consultation with inspector    20861    80    15    31.56    0.03  5   39.45   0.05   0.09 
Conducted tour, showing the documents    20861    80    8    31.56    0.02  2.7   39.45   0.03   0.05 
Answering questions    20861    80    108    31.56    0.24  36   39.45   0.39   0.63 
Concluding conversation    20861    80    8    31.56    0.02  2.7   39.45   0.03   0.05 
Administrative action to correct shortcomings    20861    80    15    31.56    0.03  5   39.45   0.05   0.09 
Receiving notice result of inspection    20861    80    3    31.56    0.01  1    39.45    0.01    0.02 
Intermediary contacts between employers and external offices     16689    0    60    31.56    0.53  0   39.45   0.00   0.53 
Intermediary contacts between external offices and employers   16689    100    0    31.56    0.00  60   39.45   0.66   0.66 
Total administrative burdens of inspection            0.92       1.32   2.25 
* Inspection mostly combined with Tax Authorities. 43 
Table 7.3   Alternative case: reduction of the number of inspections by 50%; Administrative burden of message ‘inspection of employees’ social insurance administra-








time in  
minutes 
Doing self 
euros per hour 
Doing self  
burden in  
mln. euros 
Outsourced 









den in  
mln. euros 
Collecting the required information    103431    80    11,5    31.56    0.01  7.7    39.45    0.04    0.05 
Consultation with inspector    10431    80    15    31.56    0.02  5   39.45   0.03   0.04 
Conducted tour, showing the documents    10431    80    8    31.56    0.01  2.7   39.45   0.01   0.02 
Answering questions    10431    80    54    31.56    0.06  36   39.45   0.20   0.26 
Concluding conversation    10431    80    8    31.56    0.01  2.7   39.45   0.01   0.02 
Administrative action to correct shortcomings    10431    80    15    31.56    0.02  5   39.45   0.03   0.04 
Receiving notice result of inspection    10431    80    3    31.56    0.00  1    39.45    0.01    0.01 
Intermediary contacts between employers and external offices     8345    0    60    31.56    0.26  0   39.45   0.00   0.26 
Intermediary contacts between external offices and employers   8345    100    0    31.56    0.00  60   39.45   0.33   0.33 
Total administrative burdens of inspection            0.39       0.66   1.05 
* Inspection mostly combined with Tax Authorities. 
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7.3  Meso results: industries and size classes 
From table 7.4 it appears that the administrative burdens of the selected policy areas 
were about 4.3 billion euros in 2000. The Annual Accounts information obligations are 
particularly burdensome; 1.6 billion euros or 37% of all administrative burdens of the 
selected policy areas (see also table 7.5).  
Table 7.4   Administrative burdens for businesses in selected policy areas accord-







enterprises  Total 
Payroll tax and general social insurances*    176    188    357    722 
Employees social insurances    173    161    296    630 
Income  tax    429   12    2   444 
Corporate tax and dividend tax    153    62    33    248 
VAT    558   97    19   673 
Annual  account    817   458    349   1,623 
Total    2,307   978    1,056   4,341 
*  Retirement, widows and orphans pension schemes, general health insurance. 
**  This figure differs from the parallel figure in table 7.1 where the administrative burdens for this 
policy area are assessed to be 878 million euros. The reason for this difference is that in table 7.4 
the administrative burdens of category C Payment of Benefits are not included. 
The share of administrative burdens for small firms is 53% (see also table 7.5). The most 
burdensome policy areas for small firms are the Annual Account, VAT and Income tax. 
For large enterprises it appears that the policy areas linked to employees impose the 
greatest burden i.e. payroll tax and employees’ social insurance. 
Table 7.5   Distribution of administrative burdens for businesses in selected policy 
areas according to size class (final results); the Netherlands, 2000 (per-








Payroll tax and general social insurances*    0.03    0.05    0.08  0.16 
Employees social insurances    0.03    0.04    0.08  0.15 
Income tax    0.10    -    -  0.10 
Corporate tax and dividend tax    0.04    0.01    0.01  0.06 
VAT   0.13    0.02    0.00  0.16 
Annual account    0.20    0.11    0.07  0.37 
Total   0.53    0.23    0.24  1.00 
 
Table 7.6 shows that the administrative burdens of the selected policy areas are highest 
for repair and trade, real estate and business-to-business services and manufacturing. 
However, these figures are difficult to interpret. It goes without saying that administra-
tive burdens are high in large sectors, related to the number of firms and/or the number 
of employees.    45 
Table 7.6   Administrative burdens for businesses in selected policy areas accord-
ing to size class and industry, final results; the Netherlands, 2000, euros 
(x 1,000,000) 
Industry  Small firms  Medium sized firms  Large firms  Total 
Agriculture   177    5    2  184 
Mining   2    1    2  5 
Manufacturing   308    251    289  848 
Electricity, water, gas    0    1    11  12 
Building   174    156    77  407 
Repair and trade    747    265    174  1.186 
Hotel, catering    115    43    22  180 
Transport, communication    83    77    95  255 
Financing, insurances    72    19    64  155 
Real estate, business to business    521    141    230  893 
Health and welfare    89    16    89  193 
Culture, sports and broadcasting, TV    18    3    2  22 
All private industries    2,307    978    1,056  4,341 
 
To clarify the figures administrative burdens are related to value added figures valued at 
factor costs for the various industries and size classes (see table 7.7). See Annex IV for 
detailed information about value added. This step is taken in order to show to what 
extent financial resources are redirected to administrative activities to comply with the 
transfer of information obligations imposed on a policy area.  
Table 7.7   Administrative burdens for businesses in selected policy areas accord-
ing to size class and industry as a percentage of value added in the 
Netherlands, 2000 (percentages) 
Industry  Small firms  Medium sized firms  Large firms  Total 
Agriculture 2.2  0.3  0.3  1.8 
Mining 0.6  0.1  0.0  0.1 
Manufacturing 5.0  1.8  0.8  1.5 
Electricity, water, gas  4.8  0.5  0.3  0.3 
Building 3.3  1.7  1.1  1.9 
Repair and trade  5.1  1.4  1.0  2.3 
Hotel, catering  3.9  2.6  1.3  2.9 
Transport, communication  2.8  1.3  0.6  1.0 
Financing, insurances 2.9  0.9  0.4  0.7 
Real estate, business to business  4.4  0.5  0.8  1.3 
Health and welfare  3.1  0.9  0.8  1.3 
Culture, sports and broadcasting, TV  4.4  1.1  0.7  2.4 
All private industries  4.0  1.1  0.7  1.5 46   
It appears from table 7.7 that the administrative burdens of all private enterprises are 
1.5 percent of value added. It is emphasised that these are the administrative burdens 




One of the most striking facts is that small firms incur administrative burdens for the 
selected policy areas of 4% of their own value added. This is more than twice as much 
as the percentage for all firms, and almost six times as for large enterprises. The admin-
istrative burdens of the selected policy areas are disproportionately severe for small 
firms and regressive with respect to the size class of the firms.  
 
Looking at the various industries, it appears that administrative burdens are relatively 
high for the sectors hotel and catering, (2.9%), culture, sports etc. (2.4%) and repair 
and trade (2.3%). These are all relatively small-scale sectors. As has already been 
shown, the Annual Account, VAT and Income tax are the most burdensome policy areas 
for small firms. Of course, the relatively lower level of value added, compared to large 
firms, in these industries and in small firms also explains the high percentage of admin-




 The total figure of the administrative burdens of all policy areas, as a percentage of value added is 
about 3%.   47 
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Annex I  List of symbols used 
The following symbols, together with their meaning, are used throughout the previous 
sub-sections: 
 
poma    Proportion of outsourcing for activity a, part of 
message m due to obligation o for policy area 
p  
AB   Total level of the administrative burden for all 
policy areas in the Netherlands 
perc AB   Level of the administrative burden for all policy 
areas as a percentage of the total business ex-
penses 
p AB   Level of the administrative burden for policy area 
p  
) ( pom Message Cost   Cost of message m  due to obligation o for pol-
icy area  p  
) ( po Obligation Cost   Cost of obligation o for policy area  p  
poma riff ExternalTa   External tariff in terms of money per hour for the 
person carrying out activity a, part of message 
m due to obligation o for policy area  p  
poma me ExternalTi   Required time in minutes to perform activity a, 
part of message m  due to obligation o for pol-
icy area  p  
poma Frequency   Frequency of activity a necessary to compose 
message m  due to obligation o for policy area 
p  
poma riff InternalTa   Internal tariff in terms of money per hour for the 
person carrying out activity a, part of message 
m due to obligation o for policy area  p  
poma me InternalTi    Required time in minutes within the business to 
perform activity a, part of message m  due to 
obligation o for policy area  p   
poma tities NumberOfEn   Number of reporting entities that have to en-
gage in activity a, to send to the government 
message m  due to obligation o for policy area 
p  
poma y Periodicit   Number of times per year that each reporting 
entity has to carry out activity a, to send mes-
sage m  to the government due to obligation 
o for policy area  p  
VA   Value added values at factor costs  
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The indices used: 
 
a activity 
m  message 
o  obligation 
p  policy  area 
 
The various “number of entities” used: 
 
p n
  number of policy areas 
po n
  number of obligations in policy area  p  
pom n
  number of messages associated with obligation o in policy area  p 
poma n
  number of activities in message m associated with obligation o in 
policy area  p  
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Annex II  Breakdown of entities into size classes and 
industries 
Table II.1   Number of enterprises in the private sector by size class and industry in 
the Netherlands, 2000 
  Size class 
Industry Small  Medium  Large  Total 
Agriculture   102,753    505    24  103,283 
Mining   332    60    6  398 
Manufacturing    36,868   9,323   1,407  47,598 
Electricity,  water,  gas   74   42   37  153 
Building   62,767    7,815    452  71,035 
Repair and trade    148,679    12,728    826  162,233 
Hotel, catering    38,473    2,417    96  40,986 
Transport, communication    23,939    4,003    376  28,317 
Financing, insurances   15,891    1,207    152  17,250 
Real estate, business to business    130,307    8,177    936  139,420 
Health and welfare    31,292    1,055    303  32,650 
Culture, sports and broadcasting, TV    7,299    249    24  7,572 
All private industries    598,674    47,581    4,639  650,894 
 
Table II.2   Number of employees in the private sector by size class and industry in 
the Netherlands, 2000 
  Size class 
Industry Small  Medium  Large  Total 
Agriculture   59,024    9,623    4,729  73,376 
Mining   286    1,998    6,242  8,527 
Manufacturing   94,000    274,366    469,948  838,314 
Electricity, water, gas    74    908    35,506  36,488 
Building   79,338    207,545    125,965  412,848 
Repair and trade    320,817    406,394    434,462  1,161,672 
Hotel, catering    155,759    85,625    55,429  296,813 
Transport, communication    49,377    126,965    251,996  428,338 
Financing, insurances   25,242   26,738    231,499  283,479 
Real estate, business to business    167,615    247,331    695,761  1,110,707 
Health and welfare    87,979    62,955    342,798  493,732 
Culture, sports and broadcasting, TV    7,299    4,736    4,663  16,698 
All private industries    1,046,810   1,455,182  2,658,999  5,160,991 52   
Table II.3   Number of self-dependents in the private sector by size class and indus-
try in the Netherlands, 2000 
  Size class 
Industry Small  Medium  Large  Total 
Agriculture   165,038    0    0  165,038 
Mining   99    0    0  99 
Manufacturing   49,281    3,096    0  52,376 
Electricity, water, gas    0    0    0  0 
Building   72,594    1,007    0  73,601 
Repair and trade    183,003    4,069    31  187,103 
Hotel, catering    55,345    1,168    2  56,514 
Transport, communication    26,773    1,362    702  28,837 
Financing, insurances   11,504    571    0  12,075 
Real estate, business to business    112,891    5,325    1,861  120,077 
Health and welfare    30,760    0    0  30,760 
Culture, sports and broadcasting, TV    6,846    0    0  6,846 
All private industries    714,133    16,597    2,596  733,327 
 
Table II.4   Number of corporate firms in the private sector by size class and indus-
try in the Netherlands, 2000 
  Size class 
Industry Small  Medium  Large  Total 
Agriculture   1,180    139    6  1,325 
Mining   195    57    6  259 
Manufacturing   10,435    8,549    1,329  20,313 
Electricity, water, gas    50    24    37  111 
Building   10,426    6,862    452  17,741 
Repair and trade    34,113    10,785    802  45,700 
Hotel,  catering   3,843   1,593    92  5,528 
Transport,  communication   5,709   3,268   342  9,319 
Financing, insurances   6,362    940    133  7,436 
Real estate, business to business    44,891    5,869    666  51,427 
Health and welfare    4,711    55    8  4,773 
Culture, sports and broadcasting,  TV   922   123    7  1,051 
All private industries    122,838    38,265    3,881  164,984 
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Annex III  Outsourcing and tariffs 
Table III.1   Percentages for degrees of outsourcing according to policy area and size 








Payroll tax and general social insurances*    85    30    10    80 
Employees social insurances    85    30    10    80 
Income tax    90    90    90    90 
Corporate tax and dividend tax    87    70    30    85 
VAT   0    0    0    0 
Annual account    67    50    20    65 
* Retirement, widows and orphans pension schemes, general health insurance. 
Table III.2   Internal tariffs** of firms in the private sector referring to the adminis-
trative activities of the selected policy areas by size class in the Nether-
lands, 2000 
Policy area  Small firms  Medium-sized firms  Large firms   Total 
 euros       
Payroll tax and general social  
insurances* 30.9  36.4  45.5  31.8 
Employees social insurances  30.9  36.4  45.5  31.8 
Income tax  29.5  n.a.  n.a.  29.5 
Corporate tax and dividend tax  36.4  52.3  79.5  38.6 
VAT 29.5  40.9  63.6  31.8 
Annual account  40.9  59.1  90.9  45.5 
*  Old age, widows and orphans pension schemes, General sickness insurance. 
**  Labour costs inclusive overhead. 54   
Table III.3   External tariffs of firms in the private sector referring to outsourcing of 
the administrative activities of the selected policy areas by size class in 
the Netherlands, 2000 
Policy area  Small firms  Medium-sized firms  Large firms   Total 
 euros       
Payroll tax and general social  
insurances* 36.4  52.3  79.5  39.1 
Employees social insurances  36.4  52.3  79.5  39.1 
Income tax  56.8  n.a.  n.a.  56.8 
Corporate tax and dividend tax  65.9  90.9  136.4  70 
VAT n.a  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Annual account  81.8  118.2  181.8  90.9 
* Old age, widows and orphans pension schemes, General sickness insurance.   55 
Annex IV  Value added 
Table IV.1   Value added of firms in the private sector by size class and industry in 
the Netherlands, 2000 (euros x 1,000,000) 
  Size class 
Sector Small  Medium  Large  Total 
Agriculture   7,880   1,495    656  10,030 
Mining    339   2,365   7,400  10,105 
Manufacturing    6,119   13,984   37,299  57,403 
Electricity, water, gas    9    114    4,470  4,593 
Building   5,270   9,106   7,040  21,416 
Repair  and  trade   14,781   19,160   16,991  50,932 
Hotel,  catering   2,972   1,684   1,646  6,302 
Transport,  communication   3,001   5,957    16,989  25,946 
Financing, insurances   2,512   2,069    18,059  22,640 
Real estate, business to business    11,764    29,982    27,292  69,038 
Health and welfare    2,885    1,689    10,818  15,392 
Culture, sports and broadcasting,  TV   411   260   256  928 
All private industries    57,943    87,865    148,917  294,725 
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